Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro and Iran's hard-line president have signed a 20-year cooperation agreement in Tehran
By Amir Vahdat
Associated Press
June 11, 2022
July 25, 2022
Venezuelan leader, Iranian president sign 20-year agreement
By Amir Vahdat
Associated Press
June 11, 2022
Venezuela and Iran sign 20-year cooperation deal during Maduro visit
The two allies seek to bolster ties as both suffer under crippling US sanctions
Middle East Eye
June 11, 2022
July 20, 2022
The 25-year Iran-China agreement, endangering 2,500 years of heritage
By Ghazal Vaisi
Middle East Institute
March 1, 2022
Middle East Institute
March 1, 2022
Not "business as usual": The Chinese military's visit to Iran
By Tuvia Gering and Jason M. Brodsky
Middle East Institute
May 16, 2022
Middle East Institute
May 16, 2022
Iran seeks to expand its military cooperation with China
Iran's state media say President Ebrahim Raisi expressed his government's desire for closer cooperation with China during a visit to Tehran by the Chinese defense minister
The Associated Press
ABC News
April 27, 2022
China-Iran Relations: The Myth of Massive Investment
Why the 25-Year China-Iran Strategic Cooperation Agreement isn't a "big deal," literally or figuratively.
By William Figueroa
The Diplomat
April 6, 2021
July 15, 2022
Joint naval drills reflect growing ties between China, Russia and Iran
New exercises in Indian Ocean come as all three test Washington's resolve
By Mike Glenn
The Washington Times
January 20, 2022
https://amp.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/jan/20/china-russia-iran-joint-naval-drills-reflect-growi/
Russia, Iran agree to new plane supplies deal, plan to increase flights between countries: report
Iran and Russia will increase flights between the two countries
By Peter Aitken
Fox News
July 27, 2022
Iran and Russia's 20-Year Agreement Is a Warning Shot to the West
The potential of a twenty-year Iran-Russia pact is perhaps more significant for the West than it is for Iran and Russia themselves.
By Arash Toupchinejad
The National Interest
February 19, 2022
Russia and Iran Keep Growing Closer
By Anna Borshchevskaya
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
July 26, 2022
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
July 26, 2022
Russia keeps Iran waiting on advanced weapons
Russian officials are quite aware that selling advanced weapons to Iran would jeopardise not only Moscow's ties with Israel, but would lead to additional tensions with Washington.
By Nikola Mikovic
The Arab Weekly
January 11, 2022
Russian/Iranian defense agreement for Su-35 and more, to be signed soon
By Gastón Dubois
Aviacionline
December 26, 2021
Aviacionline
December 26, 2021
How Russia Could Earn Billions From Biden's Revival of the Nuclear Deal With Iran
By Andrea Stricker
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
April 12, 2022
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
April 12, 2022
July 12, 2022
New US sanctions on Iran for shipping drones to Russia
Another three Iranian companies and an Iranian national were designated for their work on drone production for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its air force and navy.
By Joseph Haboush
Al Arabiya
September 8, 2022
https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2022/09/08/New-US-sanctions-on-Iran-for-shipping-drones-to-Russia
By Joseph Haboush
Al Arabiya
September 8, 2022
https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2022/09/08/New-US-sanctions-on-Iran-for-shipping-drones-to-Russia
Russia gets its first drones from Iran as the two countries strengthen ties
Sharing a common enemy in the U.S., Moscow is looking to Tehran for help. But there are technical issues with the first Iranian drones it has received, U.S. officials said.
By Dan De Luce, Josh Lederman and Ed Flanagan
NBC News
August 30, 2022
Iranian Drones to Russia: Capabilities and Limitations
By Farzin Nadimi
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
August 1, 2022
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
August 1, 2022
July 11, 2022
High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
February 21, 2020
February 21, 2020
Extract
Iran
In June 2016, Iran committed to address its strategic deficiencies. Iran’s action plan expired in January 2018. In February 2020, the FATF noted Iran has not completed the action plan.[1]
In October 2019, the FATF called upon its members and urged all jurisdictions to: require increased supervisory examination for branches and subsidiaries of financial institutions based in Iran; introduce enhanced relevant reporting mechanisms or systematic reporting of financial transactions; and require increased external audit requirements for financial groups with respect to any of their branches and subsidiaries located in Iran.
Now, given Iran’s failure to enact the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions in line with the FATF Standards, the FATF fully lifts the suspension of counter-measures and calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures, in line with Recommendation 19.[2]
Iran will remain on the FATF statement on [High Risk Jurisdictions Subject to a Call for Action] until the full Action Plan has been completed. If Iran ratifies the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions, in line with the FATF standards, the FATF will decide on next steps, including whether to suspend countermeasures. Until Iran implements the measures required to address the deficiencies identified with respect to countering terrorism-financing in the Action Plan, the FATF will remain concerned with the terrorist financing risk emanating from Iran and the threat this poses to the international financial system.
In October 2019, the FATF called upon its members and urged all jurisdictions to: require increased supervisory examination for branches and subsidiaries of financial institutions based in Iran; introduce enhanced relevant reporting mechanisms or systematic reporting of financial transactions; and require increased external audit requirements for financial groups with respect to any of their branches and subsidiaries located in Iran.
Now, given Iran’s failure to enact the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions in line with the FATF Standards, the FATF fully lifts the suspension of counter-measures and calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures, in line with Recommendation 19.[2]
Iran will remain on the FATF statement on [High Risk Jurisdictions Subject to a Call for Action] until the full Action Plan has been completed. If Iran ratifies the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions, in line with the FATF standards, the FATF will decide on next steps, including whether to suspend countermeasures. Until Iran implements the measures required to address the deficiencies identified with respect to countering terrorism-financing in the Action Plan, the FATF will remain concerned with the terrorist financing risk emanating from Iran and the threat this poses to the international financial system.
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[1] In June 2016, the FATF welcomed Iran’s high-level political commitment to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, and its decision to seek technical assistance in the implementation of the Action Plan. Since 2016, Iran established a cash declaration regime, enacted amendments to its Counter-Terrorist Financing Act and its Anti-Money Laundering Act, and adopted an AML by-law.
In February 2020, the FATF noted that there are still items not completed and Iran should fully address: (1) adequately criminalizing terrorist financing, including by removing the exemption for designated groups “attempting to end foreign occupation, colonialism and racism”; (2) identifying and freezing terrorist assets in line with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions; (3) ensuring an adequate and enforceable customer due diligence regime; (4) demonstrating how authorities are identifying and sanctioning unlicensed money/value transfer service providers; (5) ratifying and implementing the Palermo and TF Conventions and clarifying the capability to provide mutual legal assistance; and (6) ensuring that financial institutions verify that wire transfers contain complete originator and beneficiary information.
[2] Countries should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures when called upon to do so by the FATF. Countries should also be able to apply countermeasures independently of any call by the FATF to do so. Such countermeasures should be effective and proportionate to the risks.
The Interpretative Note to Recommendation 19 specifies examples of the countermeasures that could be undertaken by countries.
In February 2020, the FATF noted that there are still items not completed and Iran should fully address: (1) adequately criminalizing terrorist financing, including by removing the exemption for designated groups “attempting to end foreign occupation, colonialism and racism”; (2) identifying and freezing terrorist assets in line with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions; (3) ensuring an adequate and enforceable customer due diligence regime; (4) demonstrating how authorities are identifying and sanctioning unlicensed money/value transfer service providers; (5) ratifying and implementing the Palermo and TF Conventions and clarifying the capability to provide mutual legal assistance; and (6) ensuring that financial institutions verify that wire transfers contain complete originator and beneficiary information.
[2] Countries should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures when called upon to do so by the FATF. Countries should also be able to apply countermeasures independently of any call by the FATF to do so. Such countermeasures should be effective and proportionate to the risks.
The Interpretative Note to Recommendation 19 specifies examples of the countermeasures that could be undertaken by countries.
* This statement was previously called
* High-risk jurisdictions have significant strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and financing of proliferation. For all countries identified as high-risk, the FATF calls on all members and urges all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence, and in the most serious cases, countries are called upon to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the ongoing money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from the country. This list is often externally referred to as the “black list”.
2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)
U.S. Department of State
March 2016
U.S. Department of State
March 2016
Extract
Countries/Jurisdictions of Primary Concern - Iran
Iran is not a financial hub, but the imminent lifting of sanctions, including financial sector sanctions, pursuant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), could expand Iran’s regional financial significance, as investors and companies explore opportunities for new deals in Iran. Iran has a large underground economy, spurred by restrictive taxation, widespread smuggling, sanctions evasion, currency exchange controls, capital flight, and a large Iranian expatriate community. Iran is also a major transit route for opiates smuggled from Afghanistan through Pakistan to the Persian Gulf, Turkey, Russia, and Europe. At least 40 percent of opiates leaving Afghanistan enter or transit Iran for domestic consumption or for consumers in Russia and Europe. Iran’s Minister of Interior estimated in February 2015 that the combined value of narcotics trafficking and sales in Iran is worth $6 billion annually. Narcotics traffickers use illicit proceeds to purchase goods in the domestic Iranian market, often for exportation to and sale in Dubai. Iran’s merchant community makes active use of money and value transfer systems, including hawala and moneylenders. Counter-valuation in hawala transactions is often accomplished via trade, thus trade-based transactions are a prevalent form of money laundering. Many hawaladars and traditional bazaari have ties to the regional hawala hub in Dubai. Around 400,000 Iranians reside in Dubai, with an estimated 50,000 Iranian-owned companies based there. According to media reporting, Iranians have invested billions of dollars in capital in the United Arab Emirates, particularly in Dubai real estate. Money launderers also use Iran’s real estate market to hide illicit funds. There is pervasive corruption within Iran’s ruling and religious elite, government ministries, and government-controlled business enterprises.
On November 21, 2011, the U.S. Government identified Iran as a state of primary money laundering concern pursuant to Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. The FATF has repeatedly warned of Iran’s failure to address the risks of terrorist financing, urging jurisdictions around the world to impose countermeasures to protect their financial sectors from illicit finance emanating from Iran.
In 1984, the Department of State designated Iran as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. Iran continues to provide material support, including resources and guidance, to multiple terrorist organizations and other groups that undermine the stability of the Middle East and Central Asia, such as the Houthi group Ansarallah in Yemen, the Asad regime in Syria, and multiple Shia militia groups in Iraq. Hamas, Lebanese Hizballah, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) maintain representative offices in Tehran, in part to help coordinate Iranian financing and training.
Following the lifting of sanctions pursuant to JCPOA, Iranian financial institutions are expected to have access to financial messaging services. In recent years, international sanctions had curtailed Iran’s ability to send and receive international wires. While nuclear sanctions will be lifted following JCPOA implementation, the United States will continue to enforce sanctions targeting Iran’s support for terrorism, destabilizing regional activities, and ballistic missile activities.
For additional information focusing on terrorist financing, please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism, which can be found at: https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/index.htm
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For nearly two decades the United States has undertaken targeted financial actions against key Iranian financial institutions, entities, and individuals that include legislation and more than a dozen Executive Orders (E.O.s). Noteworthy actions taken against Iran under E.O.s include designating one state-owned Iranian bank (Bank Saderat and its foreign operations), which were designated for funneling money to terrorist organizations (E.O. 13224); the Qods Force, a branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), designated for providing material support to the Taliban, Lebanese Hizballah, and PIJ (E.O. 13224); and the Martyrs Foundation (also known as Bonyad Shahid), an Iranian parastatal organization that channels financial support from Iran to several terrorist organizations in the Levant, including Hizballah, Hamas, and the PIJ, designated along with Lebanon- and U.S.-based affiliates (E.O. 13224).
In October 2007, the FATF issued its first public statement expressing concern over Iran’s lack of a comprehensive AML/CFT framework. Since 2009, the FATF has urged all jurisdictions to apply effective countermeasures to protect their financial sectors from the money laundering/terrorist financing risks emanating from Iran and also stated that jurisdictions should protect against correspondent relationships being used to bypass or evade countermeasures or risk mitigation practices. Most recently, in October 2015, the FATF reiterated its call for countermeasures, urging all members and jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with Iran, including Iranian companies and financial institutions. The FATF, in its October 2015 Public Statement, said it remains concerned about Iran’s failure to address the risk of terrorist financing, and the threat this poses to the integrity of the international financial system. The FATF continues to urge Iran to immediately and meaningfully address its AML/CFT deficiencies, in particular by criminalizing terrorist financing and effectively implementing suspicious transaction reporting requirements.
July 10, 2022
Lessons on Iran from Putin's Playbook: How to Avoid Miscalculating Khamenei
Understanding the mistakes that led to the Russian invasion offers critical lessons for future Iran policy.
By Kasra Aarabi and Saeid Golkar
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
April 26, 2022
July 09, 2022
Western Media Aren't Telling You the Truth About Iran
Reporters would rather tweet about the weather than investigate repression and torture by the regime.
By Hossein Ronaghi
The Wall Street Journal
The Wall Street Journal
October 12, 2021
July 08, 2022
Six reasons why Iran won't change
Nothing can change. It is in the nature of the mullahs' regime, if it stays untouched, to wreak havoc in the region.
By Ali Sarraf
The Arab Weekly
The Arab Weekly
June 2, 2019
July 07, 2022
Stop Being Complicit
Too many nations are content to let Iran keep terrorizing its own people and the world.
By Lamont Colucci
Associate professor of politics
Ripon College
U.S. News & World Report
January 8, 2018
Associate professor of politics
Ripon College
U.S. News & World Report
January 8, 2018
Extract
Simply put, Iran is not only a terror state terrorizing its own populace, but also the number one state sponsor of terrorism in the world. Any deal kept or made with such a regime makes those nations complicit in Iranian actions. Any nation placing this deal over the lives of the protesters is worse than the regime itself.
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